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The Transition from Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics found at the heart 
of Immanuel Kant’s last, unfinished work, the so-called Opus postumum,1 has prompted some 
serious interrogations in recent years. If ever the Saul Bellow quote that, ‘I am a great believer 
in the power of an unfinished work to keep you alive,’ were an apt description, it is surely in 
reference to Opus postumum. Kant is truly kept alive in the innovative research designed to 
unravel the mysterious text. However, there is still much to be done and in this essay I approach 
Opus postumum from an angle I feel has not been systematically explored in the literature. 
I shall first introduce the Transition as comprising two ‘tasks’: one oriented toward a 
reformulation of Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) and one toward a 
methodological transition from metaphysics of nature to physics. I focus on the latter task in 
this essay.2 We must note, however, that there is not a sharp line drawn between these two 
tasks – Kant often skips from one to the other without warning – but we can begin to trace the 
differences by focusing on changes of terminology and tone throughout Opus postumum. Thus, 
when Kant drafts sections concerning the critical role of the transition, the meaning of physics 
                                                 
1 I cite passages in Opus postumum according to volume and page number in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, edited 
by the Prussian (now German) Academy of Sciences (1900–), followed by the page number in the English 
translation: Kant (1998). I cite all of Kant’s other works according to volume and page number in the Academy 
edition also, except Critique of Pure Reason, which is quoted according to first and second edition pagination (as 
is customary). Unless otherwise stated – by marking ‘t.m’ for ‘translation modified’ or ‘m.t’ for ‘my translation’ 
– I follow the translations of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Abbreviations: ‘C’, 
Correspondence; ‘CJ’, Critique of Judgement; ‘CPR’, Critique of Pure Reason; ‘LM’, Lectures on Metaphysics; 
‘MF’, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science; ‘OP’, Opus postumum; ‘P’, Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics; ‘PG’, Physical Geography; ‘PM’, Physical Monadology 
2 Thus, such concepts as ‘force,’ ‘matter,’ ‘cohesion,’ ‘ether,’ and ‘dynamics,’ which regularly feature in 
discussions of Opus postumum will be viewed as constituting the side of the Transition which reformulates the 
content of Metaphysical Foundations and will accordingly be suspended in favour of the architectonic thematic. 
By proceeding in this way, I argue we gain a more macroscopic view of Kant’s intention, enabling us to 
contextualize the reformulation of Metaphysical Foundations and perhaps provide some clues as to why Kant felt 




and systematic unity, we can ascertain that he is operating within a methodological 
architectonic register, that is, in a context concerning the overarching structural rules of 
investigation within subject-areas. If this proves true, we may conjecture a suspicion: a 
problematic (albeit consistent) arc is formed between the methodological figurations found in 
Architectonic of Pure Reason3 and the methodological fragments found in the Transition. That 
is to say, how Kant divides metaphysics and physics in the Architectonic may be related to 
how he divides them in Transition. The initial question, then, which guides this investigation 
is: what relationship is there between metaphysics and physics in (1) the Architectonic of Pure 
Reason and (2) the Transition, and do (1) and (2) relate to each other in this regard? 
I conclude the essay by suggesting that a transition of the concept of architectonic itself 
emerges in answering these questions. This suggestion is premised on showing how the 
methodological perspectives in the critical edifice are unclear as to the systematic division of 
metaphysics and physics, nor do they allow for the coalescence of different disciplines. In 
contrast to this, what is at stake in the Transition is the opposite, namely, how we arrive at, 
account for and create the possibility of systematic division and methodological transition. 
Hence, the architectonic in the Transition is conceived of as a fluid building-site upon which 
disciplines share concepts and slide into one another systematically. This indicates a changed 
understanding of architectonic in Kant’s corpus. 
A note on the method of this essay. I focus on the connections and disjunctions between 
Transition and Kant’s wider architectonic concerns in parts of his corpus. Accordingly, where 
there are strong continuities with or strong departures from the Kant we believe we know, I 
adopt the perspective that these points should be traced through to their conclusion. My choice 
of texts depends upon how far or close they seem to the text of Transition. I try to avoid reading 
the pre-critical and critical edifice into the Transition, opting instead to pull out a series of 
                                                 
3 CPR A832-51/B860-79 
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complications of Kant’s edifices (especially his understanding of metaphysics and physics) 
from the Transition. Where a text seems equivocal to the architectonic of Transition I have 
side-lined it, opting only for the texts which harbour the most striking convergences and 
divergencies. This sometimes requires what could be considered ‘unorthodox’ reconstructions 
of the Transition. That is, not reconstruction in the sense of repeating Kant’s system or ‘ironing 
it out,’ but striving toward toward the core of his thinking4 – no matter how far from standard 
readings this takes us – and thinking with Kant rather than about him. Owing to its unfinished 
state, Opus postumum is particularly conducive to this methodology. Moreover, we gain the 
hope of a unique, unexplored trajectory through Kant’s corpus, opening the way for new 
philosophical reflections about the critical edifice and for the chance to sculpt a Kant we have 
not yet come to fully know. 
 
1. The Basis of a Suspicion 
Übergang is a term repeated throughout Opus postumum but scholars are still not in agreement 
as to what Kant means by it. In its most skeletal form it means transition, or a bridge from one 
species of cognition to another. This skeletal concept is not entirely alien to the critical edifice; 
we can, for example, already see a ‘secret transition’ between sensibility and reason – a hidden 
transition between the faculties – in the first Critique.5 Howard Caygill rationalizes this 
argument in the following way: 
 
if the demarcations between the faculties are followed rigorously, if the unities of reason and 
the understanding are generically different, then experience and the process of unification 
becomes problematic. It is thus necessary, already in the first Critique, to show that the 
                                                 
4 As in the Deleuzian- Žižekian formula: ‘Let us take a great philosopher like Kant. There are two modes to repeat 
him. Either one sticks to his letter and further elaborates or changes his system…or one tries to regain the creative 
impulse that Kant himself betrayed in the actualization of his system (i.e., to connect to what was already “in Kant 
more than Kant himself,” more than his explicit system, its excessive core).’ Žižek (2012, 11) 
5 Caygill (2007, 19) 
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demarcations between the faculties are bridgeable, or in the language of the Opus postumum, 
that it is possible for there to be a transition between them.6 
 
Kant never fully acknowledges these ‘bridgeable’ demarcations in the first Critique, instead 
burying them in the subterranean depths of the work. We also see the concept of transition 
arising in the third Critique in the context of the passage from theoretical to practical 
philosophy.  
 
There must, therefore, be a ground of the unity of the supersensible that lies at the basis of 
nature, with what the concept of freedom contains in a practical way, and although the concept 
of this ground neither theoretically nor practically attains to a knowledge of it, and so has no 
peculiar realm of its own, still it renders possible the transition from the mode of thought 
according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other.7 
 
That is to say, there is a movement between the two fundamental axes which underpin Kant’s 
entire corpus: nature and morality. Although this discussion is significant, the concept of the 
transition between metaphysics and physics remains undiscussed. Moreover, Kant does not 
consider what would be peculiar to this transition in a methodological sense.8 
The concept of transition found in Opus postumum is altogether different. Indeed, in 
the Transition project, the methodological transition from metaphysics to physics is discussed; 
we could even say that in Opus postumum the concept bubbles to the surface, sometimes 
                                                 
6 Caygill (2007, 19) 
7 CJ 5:176 
8 I thank the anonymous report from Angelaki for pointing out this connection. They question why I left out the 
reflections on transition found in Critique of Judgement, which is an excellent point. The reason, as I have stated 
in the main body of text, is that the notion of transition in the third Critique is explicitly tied to the transition from 
theoretical to practical philosophy. Although this passage is perhaps one of the greatest questions in Kant 
scholarship, this is an entirely different problematic to the one I attempt to raise here. Another reason for its 
absence is the already huge interpretive weight placed on Critique of Judgement as well as more recently the 
Critique of Practical Reason in the Opus postumum literature. For the former, see Friedman (1994, 242-64), 
Förster, (2000) and for the latter see Thorndike (2018). 
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violently.9 In this less obscure context Kant is direct about what he means by transition, 
expounding upon his more secret use of the term in the first and third Critiques. Throughout 
the various mutations of Opus postumum Kant rephrases and repeats this meaning endlessly. 
Although, as Bryan Wesley Hall argues, there is a transformative arch to these repetitions (Hall 
locates three different incarnations in the later fascicles),10 there is a basic outline which 
remains somewhat stable in the early fascicles. This is the bridge from a priori metaphysics of 
nature to empirical physics. As much as Kant’s last work continually weaves and shifts through 
our fingers, the motif of these two sides blurring into a ‘philosophia naturalis,’11 or ‘natural 
science’ remains consistent throughout the early fascicles and this warrants further 
investigation. 
 We get a gloss of this motif in the preface of Metaphysical Foundations of Natural 
Science published in 1786, wherein Kant demarks one part of natural science as pure and the 
other as applied, aligning the former with a priori cognition and the latter with empirical 
cognition.12 Kant remarks, ‘proper science, and above all proper natural science requires a pure 
part lying at the basis of the empirical part, and resting on a priori cognition of natural things.’13 
Divisions between ‘pure’ and ‘mixed,’ or ‘simple’ and ‘composite’ were quite common in 
eighteenth century speculative metaphysics so it is no surprise that Kant reflects this. It is well 
known, for example, that throughout his lecturing career Kant used Baumgarten’s Metaphysica 
as a textbook, which administers such divisions in relation to ‘internal being.’14 But unique to 
the Kant of Metaphysical Foundations is a nuanced arrangement of the possibility of natural 
                                                 
9 To pick one example, in fascicle V, between OP 21:523; 35 and 21:524; 36, Kant immediately skips from an 
intense discussion of heat and caloric to a ‘Preface’ in which he discusses the methodological meaning of ‘science 
of nature,’ ‘transition,’ and the structural role of Metaphysical Foundations.  
10 Hall (2017, 12) 
11 ‘But there needs to be a transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics for science 
of nature to become science of reason (philosophia naturalis).’ OP 21:474-5; 39 (t.m). Sometimes Kant also refers 
to this as Scientia naturalis. For an enlightening discussion on this topic see Michael Friedman’s introduction to 
the Cambridge Edition of Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.  
12 MF 4:468-9 
13 MF 4:470 
14 See Baumgarten, (2017, Chap. II, Sect. VIIII) 
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science, the metaphysics of nature, their divisions and interconnections, and a whole-hearted 
attempt to provide foundations to Newtonian natural philosophy. For Kant, natural science 
indexes a metaphysics of nature since it attempts to understand the necessity found in the 
existence of things, a necessity which cannot be given in experience. Metaphysics of nature is 
accordingly condensed to purely a priori inquiry: ‘Now [metaphysics of nature] must always 
contain solely principles that are not empirical (for precisely this reason it bears the name of a 
metaphysics)’.15 Kant further divides the metaphysics of nature into a part which deals with 
general concepts of nature – the ‘transcendental’ – and a part which deals with the particular 
nature of a thing – ‘special’ metaphysics, or even at certain points, simply ‘physics’.16  
There are several ways to approach these formulations, but it is generally understood 
that the transcendental side of the metaphysics of nature is the Critique of Pure Reason, whilst 
the special metaphysical side is the Metaphysical Foundations.17 There is, however, a problem 
with such a reading on a few levels. First, Kant references a future work entitled Metaphysics 
of Nature in both the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason.18 This indicates 
that Kant had a work other than the first Critique in mind when citing metaphysics of nature 
and both of its sides. Indeed, we must assume that the first Critique is the transcendental 
propaedeutic to such a work instead of the work itself, as Kant himself indicates:  
 
Such a system of pure (speculative) reason I hope myself to deliver under the title Metaphysics 
of Nature, which will be not half so extensive but will be incomparably richer in content than 
this critique, which had first to display the sources and conditions of its possibility, and needed 
to clear and level a ground that was completely overgrown.19  
                                                 
15 MF 4:469 
16 MF 4:470 
17 See Friedman (2015, 588) 
18 CPR Axxxi and Bxliii 
19 CPR Axxi. I am in agreement with Fӧrster (2000, 53-54) on this point. Also see OP 22:240; 56, where Kant 
claims that the Transition is not a propaedeutic: ‘The transition is not merely a propaedeutic, for that would be an 




Second, Kant recognizes the need to actively separate metaphysics of nature and special 
metaphysics as a methodological issue in Metaphysical Foundations: 
 
And because this pure part is wholly different, in regard to its principles, from those that are 
merely empirical, it is also of the greatest utility to expound this part as far as possible in its 
entirety, separated and wholly unmixed with the other part; indeed, in accordance with the 
nature of the case it is an unavoidable duty with respect to method.20 
 
As Michael Freidman puts it, ‘The line between metaphysical questions…and physical 
questions…is therefore sharply drawn.’21 But Metaphysical Foundations goes on to discuss 
problems of a physical character, such as kinematics (phoronomy) and dynamics, blended with 
a transcendental methodology. In other words, the two sides seem inextricably linked under 
the rubric of natural science. The problem is that Kant seems to assume that natural science, 
for it to be natural science proper, inherently unifies the special and transcendental elements 
of the metaphysics of nature without indicating how the line is drawn methodologically. In the 
wording of the Preface, for example, Kant’s tone is one of primary unification: ‘Properly so-
called natural science presupposes, in the first place, metaphysics of nature.’22 What can this 
‘in the first place’ mean other than, ‘to begin with,’ ‘without labouring,’ ‘naturally’? 
This discussion intersects different debates on the relation between Metaphysical 
Foundations and the Transition. There are many nuances to each commentator’s position, far 
too many to retrace all of them in detail here, but there is a general consensus that on some 
level the Transition project is in dialogue with Metaphysical Foundations.23 One of the main 
                                                 
20 MF 4:469 
21 Friedman (1994, 216) 
22 MF 4:469 (italics added) 
23 In particular see Tuschling (1989, 194-5) and (1971, 56-61), Friedman (1994, 237; 222-42), Fӧrster (2000, 61-
66) and Hall (2015, 10) 
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issues highlighted is the ‘circularity problem’ wherein Kant is at pains to escape the paradoxical 
logic exhibited in Metaphysical Foundations that attractive force is relative to the density of 
matter, but that the density of matter is composed by original attractive force.24 This is 
mentioned in an oft-quoted letter Kant sent to Jacob Sigismund Beck in 1792: 
 
I think the solution to this problem lies in this: the attraction (the universal, Newtonian 
attraction) is originally equal in all matter; it is only the repulsive force that varies in different 
kinds of matter, and this is what determines differences in density. But this solution seems to 
lead to a kind of circularity. I cannot see how to escape from this circularity and I must give it 
more thought.25 
 
Hall provides the clearest overview of the problematic: ‘Kant’s theory of density is circular 
since original attraction is proportional to the density of matter (or its quantity in a given 
volume), but the matter itself could not exist were it not for original attraction.’26 The secondary 
literature reflects this problematic by responding in various ways: the Transition is a 
‘correction’ (Korrektur) of Metaphysical Foundations (Tuschling), an extension of its thesis 
(Friedman), an attempt to go beyond it (Fӧrster), or is a reversal of it (Hall). 
I believe the circularity problem may have originally prompted Kant to begin 
constructing the Transition, but it cannot and does not explain the structural role the Transition 
plays in relation to Metaphysical Foundations; nor does it tell us how the Transition fits into 
the critical edifice more generally. The issue is simply that this interpretive strand does not 
account for the stray architectonic elements found in the Transition. If we start solely from the 
circularity problem we risk uncritically staying within Kant’s ambiguously defined ‘special 
                                                 
24 This stems from ‘Metaphysical Foundations of Dynamics’ Proposition 5-6 (MF 4:508-12), Proposition 8 (MF 
4:516-23) and the ‘General Remark to Dynamics’ (MF 4:532-5) 
25 C 11:376-7 
26 Hall (2017, 9). Kant himself notes the paradoxical character of this reasoning in fascicle IX, OP 22:205-06; 27 
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metaphysics,’ only shedding light on the material problem of density or discussing a historical 
definition of matter and force. For this reason, I think it is reasonable to provisionally divide 
the Transition along the lines of two interconnected tasks: one which tries to sketch a new 
special metaphysics (prompted by the circularity problem in Metaphysical Foundations), and 
one which develops an architectonic of the metaphysics of nature and physics, and their 
relation. The former can be tentatively identified by the extensive discussions of matter, force, 
cohesion and the infamous ether; the latter by discussions of the structure and meaning of 
metaphysics of nature, physics and their possible intervalence in the critical edifice. 
 Those familiar with the literature may be reminded here of the ‘two works’ thesis. The 
argument states that the text of Opus postumum is comprised of two works: one designed to 
tackle issues in Metaphysical Foundations and another dealing with issues of transcendental 
philosophy more generally.27 The contention is that the early fascicles and certain parts of the 
later fascicles are a singular work, whilst the last fascicle (fascicle I) constitutes the beginning 
of a different work altogether. I would like to distinguish my thesis from this in that I do not 
claim that there are two works, one dealing with Metaphysical Foundations and one with 
transcendental philosophy. My thesis is that there are two sides – perhaps two parts – of a 
singular work, one with the task of reformulating special metaphysics, the other with the task 
of providing a methodological anchor to such a reformulation.28  
Focusing on the methodological task, I believe we can trace a critical problematization 
the Transition instigates on at least two fronts: (1) an assumed synthesis in Critique of Pure 
Reason and Metaphysical Foundations; and (2) the overlapping of metaphysics and physics. 
                                                 
27 See Werkmeister (1975, 19) for an overview of the argument 
28 In other words, perhaps more speculatively, one side equates to a new Doctrine of Elements, the other to a new 
Doctrine of Method: ‘The progression (progressus) in cognition via science in general, starts by finding its 
elements and then connects them (verknüpfen) in an orderly interconnection (zusammengeordnet) 
(systematically). Then, the division of this enterprise into a doctrine of elements and a doctrine of method 
constitutes the supreme division of which the latter arranges the concepts presented by the former to found a 
scientific whole’ OP 21:386; 13 (t.m) 
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Correlated to each methodological front are two tacit moves Kant makes in the Transition: (1a) 
the systematic division of metaphysics from physics; and (2a) the systematic connection of 
metaphysics and physics into a unity.  
Whether this suspicion can be proved will be the objective of this essay, but at the very 
least I aim to offer a different strand of interpretation from those found in the literature by 
opening the Transition to this reading. 
 
2. Systematic Division: Einteilung 
I will first provide a brief, contextual reading of Kant’s methodological use of the term 
‘transition’ in Opus postumum.  
In fascicle IV Kant proclaims that ‘the transition from metaphysics to physics cannot 
be satisfied immediately, by a leap,’ but must instead proceed cautiously via a step.29 We are 
given a key starting point here, which contributes to understanding how Kant divides 
metaphysics and physics: there is a decisive difference between a step (glossed in Latin as 
passus) and a leap (glossed in Latin as saltus).30 The Transition must proceed without 
immediately skipping from one species of cognition to the other, or in other words, its role is 
to critically distinguish two elements, and devise a method for revolving from one to the other 
without assuming that a synthesis has already taken place.  
I start by claiming that Metaphysical Foundations harbours exactly the type of 
assumption of synthesis (between the two types of metaphysics it delineates: special and 
transcendental) the Transition prohibits. But before we can understand and unpack exactly 
what this means in the wider context of the Transition, we must first unpick the source of this 
                                                 
29 OP 21:482; 43 
30 OP 21:387; 13 
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assumption. In fact, we can find this right at the heart of the critical edifice. In his copy of the 
first edition of the first Critique31 Kant inserted this diagrammatic note in the centre-fold:  
 
1. Axioms of Intuition. Formal. 
Pure mathematics – pura 
Applied mathematics – dynamics. 
2. Anticipations of Perception. Real. 
Perception if the consciousness 
of an appearance (before any concept)  
 
3. Analogies of Experience 
4. Postulates of empirical 
Thinking in general 
 
The heading ‘physiology’ is what I will discuss. What does this term mean for Kant?  
In Carus’ translation of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics the editor explains it 
succinctly: ‘Kant uses the term physiological in its etymological meaning as “pertaining to the 
science of physics,” that is, nature in general.’32 In the current age we understand the term 
‘physiology’ as the study of biological functions of organisms, but Kant understood it as 
pertaining to the physical investigation of nature and its forces. In this regard, Kant’s 
understanding of the term ‘physiology’ mirrors our own contemporary understanding of the 
term ‘physics.’ Yet, as we can see in the diagrammatic note this would prove problematic, since 
Kant further divides physiology into a physical and metaphysical arm. This is a curious move 
and challenges the received notion that Kant had already instigated a divisive split and 
                                                 
31 CPR A161/B200nA 
32 P 4:303n5. Coincidentally, the position of this note in Prolegomena conforms to the location of the 
diagrammatic note found in the first Critique: the ‘dynamical/physiological principles’ in the first Critique, or 







subsequent bridge between metaphysics and physics at this point in his career. Recall that some 
of Kant’s earliest work deals with this exact problem, for example the Physical Monadology 
of 1756, which treats metaphysics and geometry (represented by Leibnizian-Wolffian 
monadology and Newtonian natural philosophy, respectively) as two very different poles in 
need of a bridge.33 In particular, Kant is interested in the divisibility of space, where 
metaphysics denies the infinite divisibility of space, whilst geometry affirms it. Kant proceeds 
to carefully synthesize these two seemingly opposed elements – rephrased as an antinomy in 
Kant’s later critical work – in a way which does not subordinate one to the other34 but ‘marries’ 
them into a tenable framework. Thus, metaphysics is conceived of as the ‘support’ of physics, 
but nonetheless a separate discipline.35 Must we say, then, that Kant modifies this stance in 
Critique of Pure Reason by dividing metaphysics, or metaphysical activities, and physiology, 
understood as physics, along different lines, whereby metaphysics appears subordinated to 
physics? 
 To stake an answer, let’s first turn in more detail to the first Critique. 
In the Architectonic of Pure Reason, Kant develops a schematic for the metaphysics of 
nature, placing physiology on one of its sides: ‘Metaphysics in this narrower sense consists of 
transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason.’36 He explains that ‘the latter 
[physiology of pure reason] considers nature, i.e., the sum total of given objects…and is 
therefore physiology (though only rationalis).’37 Kant then says that ‘Rational Physiology’ 
‘contains two divisions, physica rationalis and psychologia rationalis.’38 We can see, then, that 
                                                 
33 PM 1:475 
34 ‘it is neither the case that the geometer is mistaken nor that the opinion to be found among metaphysicians 
deviates from the truth.’ PM 1:480 
35 PM 1:475 
36 CPR A845/B873 
37 CPR A845/B873 
38 CPR A846-7/B874-5 
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between the diagrammatic note quoted above and the Architectonic of Pure Reason a genetic 
transformation of the meaning of physiology has taken place.39  
In the diagrammatic note Kant starts by basing physiology on a fundamental empiricism 
(it stems from Analogies of Experience and Postulates of Empirical Thinking), branching it 
into a physical and a metaphysical role. What we can take from this is that physiology is open 
to the empirical and the metaphysical in equal measure but is fundamentally concerned with 
application in experience. As we can see, by the time we reach the Architectonic of Pure 
Reason, the openness of physiology has closed, as has its fundamental empirical concern. No 
longer is physiology concerned with application in experience, it now denotes a purely 
‘rational’ (metaphysical, a priori) operation in that it studies the totality of given objects. What 
started as an empirically oriented activity in the diagrammatic note has genetically transformed 
into a purely rational activity in the Architectonic. With the empirical closed, Kant goes on to 
index physica rationalis in rational physiology; but does Kant mean to say that physics should 
be placed under the heading of a purely rational, that is metaphysical, a priori pursuit, a 
contention which is surely absurd by today’s definitions? 
Physica rationalis occupied a central role in the scientific climate of the eighteenth 
century and it is certainly reflected in Kant’s understanding of physics. In the essay, ‘Kant on 
the Systematicity of Physics and the Opus postumum,’ Hein van den Berg provides a detailed 
historical account of what this term meant and how it affected Kant’s understanding of natural 
science. I shall first briefly draw out Berg’s analysis, then examine whether Kant’s conception 
conforms to this analysis in the first Critique, Metaphysical Foundations and the Transition. 
                                                 
39 Kant’s understanding of physiology is multi-faceted and indeed transforms throughout his career – in his 
Lectures on Anthropology, for example, Kant discusses ‘medical physiology’ – for an engaging discussion of this 
see Hatfield (2014, 41-7). Here I will only concentrate on the transformation the term undergoes in the first 
Critique and Metaphysical Foundations. 
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Berg tells us that physica rationalis, as it was understood in eighteenth century physics 
textbooks, pertains to ‘universal properties or a universal doctrine of nature.’40 It is a physics 
based on rational principles, which tries to describe phenomena synthetically proceeding from 
cause to effect.41 Essentially, it is the part of physics that deals with concepts, rather than 
observable and particular phenomena. For example, we can only observe natural forces as they 
affect objects, we cannot observe them directly as singular instances of force. For this reason, 
according to physica rationalis, to understand and probe natural forces we must construct a 
concept of them. Likewise, with the common problem of extension in continental philosophy: 
we cannot observe a singular instance of extension, we must construct a concept, which is 
general, to understand it.  
Berg tells us that opposed to physica rationalis is physica specialis which is concerned 
with empirical phenomena and particular behaviours of objects observed in physical 
experiments. An example of this would be the study of ‘fluids in capillary tubes,’42 – a subject 
which interested Kant a great deal in Opus postumum – where a specific behaviour of liquid is 
observed and a fact derived. To extend this example a little further, such a fact looks like this, 
‘The liquid wets the tube with an advancing contact angle of θ. If D is small and θ<90ο, then a 
concave meniscus forms inside the tube.’43 This material fact remains mute with regard to 
universal principles; it only describes an effect observed under given conditions. No universal 
concept is necessitated since the experimental aspect of physica specialis keeps it firmly within 
the bounds of empirical investigation and phenomena. 
Considering this historical context, we can begin to locate the weight, but also the 
profound problematic of physica rationalis and physiology in the Architectonic of Pure Reason 
in a fuller sense. Since physica rationalis is a pursuit involving general, or universal concepts 
                                                 
40 Berg (2014, 158) 
41 Berg (2014, 161) 
42 Berg (2014, 162) 
43 Extrand (2015, 136) 
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in the scientific paradigm of the day, Kant pairs it with a priori cognition in his own system, 
whilst remaining cautious not to conflate it with mathematics: ‘One should not think, indeed, 
that I understand by [physica rationalis] what is commonly called physica generalis, which is 
more mathematics than philosophy of nature.’44 Thus, physica rationalis is not mixed with 
empirical elements, yet is separate from mathematics, which seems to indicate that physica 
rationalis is a subordinate type of metaphysics, perhaps what we would call ‘theoretical 
physics’ today. 
But, as mentioned above, there is still a schism between the diagrammatic note and the 
Architectonic in this regard, suggesting a kind of rogue entity in the critical edifice. What’s 
more, not only is there a genetic transformation, such a transformation makes it difficult to 
know exactly how Kant understands physics in the first Critique. Admittedly, he does try to 
rectify the problem in the Architectonic, stating, ‘The metaphysics of corporeal nature is called 
physics, but, since it is to contain only the principles of its a priori cognition, rational 
physics’,45 and it is with this definition that we can bring the genetic transformation of 
physiology to an end in the first Critique. Although there should not be a problem with the 
transformation of terms – Kant’s whole oeuvre can be seen as a continual transformation, even 
– the problem with this case in particular, which we must assume did not entirely escape Kant’s 
attention, is that an empirical enterprise has trespassed into a priori territory ‘behind our backs,’ 
so to speak. I will now pass on to how this conflation complicates elements of Metaphysical 
Foundations. 
The two branches of the metaphysics of nature set out in the Architectonic are discussed 
in the Preface of Metaphysical Foundations, but another transformation has apparently taken 
place. Now, Kant introduces the term ‘special metaphysics’ to denote the empirical concepts 
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45 CPR A846/B874 
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of particular objects. That is to say, the two branches of metaphysics of nature are now re-
defined as ‘transcendental’ and ‘special,’ rather than ‘transcendental’ and ‘physiological’. 
Under the banner of this new term, Kant says that it must,  
 
concern itself with a particular nature of this or that kind of thing, for which an empirical concept 
is given, but still in such a manner that outside of what lies in this concept, no other empirical 
principle is used for its cognition…and here such a science must still always be called a 
metaphysics of nature, namely, of corporeal or of thinking nature. However, [in this second 
case] it is then not a general, but a special metaphysical natural science (physics or 
psychology).46 
 
We see, then, that the same description is given to account for corporeal nature in the 
Architectonic of Pure Reason and the Preface of Metaphysical Foundations, but the terms have 
changed. This could perhaps explain why the two poles of the metaphysics of nature seem to 
embody an assumption of synthesis in Metaphysical Foundations. Special metaphysics has 
emerged from a genetic transformation, first from an empirically understood physiology, then 
to a rational physiology (physica rationalis), which is a priori, and now to a disciplinary 
concept of metaphysics meant to delineate the a priori elements behind empirical concepts.47 
Taken by itself, special metaphysics is an innovative nuance to the critical edifice, one which 
is designed to provide foundations for Newtonian dynamics. However, when considered 
genetically as a line stemming from physiology, understood as physics, this suggests a 
conflation, or at least, an undecidability on Kant’s part. Between the first Critique and 
Metaphysical Foundations, the two terms of metaphysics of nature are not systematically 
                                                 
46 MF 4:470 
47 See Westphal (1995, 49-52) for an engaging discussion of the continuity and subtle transformation of special 
metaphysics in Metaphysical Foundations 
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distinguished, meaning that Kant has made a leap. It may be helpful to chart this evolution in 
the following way:  
Diagrammatic Note: 
    EMPIRICAL 
     Physiology 
 




Physiology    Transcendental 
 
       Physica Rationalis          Psychologia Rationalis 
 
Metaphysical Foundations: 
METAPHYSICS OF NATURE 
Special Transcendental 
 
 Empirical          A priori 
  
             Physiology 
 
Eighteenth Century Physics: 




A priori      Empirical 
 
Without suggesting that this is the definite location of the ‘gap’ (Kluft) in the critical edifice (a 
problem still not convincingly answered in Kant studies), I would simply like to ask: is this 
problem resolved in the Transition? 
Returning to Berg, he argues that physica rationalis forms the ‘part of physics that is 
concerned with corporeal nature’48 in Opus postumum. Considering the preceding, this seems 
a difficult assertion to justify, since it would mean that Kant carries over the entire problematic 
structure into the core of the Transition.49 Even on a light skim, it is obvious that Kant does 
something utterly different in the Transition: he establishes a hard and fast – architectonic – 
line between metaphysics and physics. One example of this is in fascicle III: ‘The doctrine of 
the laws of the moving forces of matter, insofar as they are known a priori, is called 
metaphysics, insofar as they can only be derived from experience, physics.’50 Thus, the a priori 
concepts of nature (the forces of matter) are aligned with metaphysics, whilst facts derived 
from experience of nature (via empirical experiment/research [Naturforschung]) are aligned 
with physics. In this regard, Kant goes much further in delineating metaphysics and physics 
than Berg suggests, tackling a much deeper problematic of division in the critical edifice.51 
Kant also provides a decisive role for philosophy: 
                                                 
48 Berg (2014, 157) 
49 Kant also seems to hint at this argument: ‘There is still, however, in these Foundations of Natural Science, a 
tendency toward physics, i.e. to a system of the moving forces of matter which must be taken from experience, 
and whose investigation (indagatio, perscrutatio naturae), as a system of these forces, is called physics. This is a 
doctrine of motion from empirical principles which must be [ordered] in a system of perceptions and, hence, 
formally subordinated to certain a priori principles.’ OP 22:189-90; 51 
Compare with: ‘In the transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics it is necessary 
to abstract from everything which rests on empirical principles, for, otherwise, this would amount to a 
transgression of foreign territory (by μετάβασιν είς ἂλλο γένος).’ OP 22:200; 54. The Greek quotation reads: 
‘Transition into a different sphere’, which is generally understood as a ‘category mistake’ in todays language. See 
Fӧrster’s editorial note in OP (264, n40). 
50 OP 21:310; 25. Also see: OP 21:402; 21:407; 18; 21:474; 39; 21:476; 40; 21:524; 36; 22:200; 54; and 22:240; 
56 
51 Also see Ducheyne (2011, 6) wherein he locates the importance of delineating metaphysics and physics in 
Kant’s later career. My problem with Ducheyne’s reading is that he does not give this division its due weight nor 




These two territories (metaphysics of nature and physics) do not immediately interconnect; and, 
hence, one cannot cross from one to the other simply by putting one foot in front of the other. 
Rather, there exists a gap between the two, over which philosophy must build a bridge in order 




Between metaphysics and physics there still exists a wide gap (hiatus in systemato) across which 
the transition cannot be a step but requires a bridge of intermediate concepts 
(Zwischenbegriffen) which make a distinctive structure. A system can never be constructed out 
of merely empirical concepts.53 
 
The subsequent architectonic nuance of the Transition is seen in microcosmic form in these 
quotations. Metaphysics and physics are now two entirely divided ‘territories,’ that are not 
connected in any way, nor synthesized in any natural sense, instead their systematic division is 
the primary philosophical function of the Transition. Only when this has been achieved can we 
proceed to labour over their unison.  
Far from merely describing a passage, then, the Transition first contains a methodology 
of division. The principle from which Kant motivates the division is binary alignment: 
metaphysics aligns with a priori cognition; physics aligns with empirical cognition. It is at this 
precise point in the Transition that a systematic division has been made. This, in turn, forms a 
new architectonic branch: the metaphysics of nature is strictly transcendental and a priori, and 
stands in opposition to physics, which is strictly special and empirical. Within this division 
there are many lines Kant throws out in the Transition, specifically those reformulating the 
                                                 
52 OP 21:475; 39 (t.m) 
53 OP 21:476; 40 (t.m) I explore the notion of intermediary concepts (Mittelbegriffe) at the end of the next section 
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contents of Metaphysical Foundations – e.g. the a priori coordinates of cohesion, or the re-
description of density of matter – but they are fundamentally indexed in the architectonic 
elements of Transition, which is to say, as developments in the unique disciplinary space the 
transition opens. In this connection, the transition is now to be thought of as a completely 
separate disciplinary field: ‘the concept of a transition is a concept given a priori in the doctrine 
of elements of the science of nature in general, and demands a special discipline of its own.’54 
As I have stated above, it is not my intention to explore these lines here since they would 
require us to go into the side of Transition dealing with the reformulation of Metaphysical 
Foundations, I hope simply to indicate how this reformulation falls under wider 
methodological auspices. 
As far as this essay is concerned, then, the remaining methodological question of the 
Transition concerns systematic unity. 
 
3. Systematic Unity: Einheit 
As can be ascertained from the preceding discussion, in Opus postumum we are not merely 
presented with a pre-established unity of metaphysics and physics, nor do we encounter a 
description of the passage from one to the other, instead we join Kant in the process of dividing 
them and unifying them philosophically. This owes much to the fact that Opus postumum is an 
unfinished work, but more importantly, it indicates that ‘reading’ the latter – systematic unity 
– in the Transition requires reconstructing it by tapping into the creative impulse of Kant’s 
project, rather than following it step by step, as mentioned in the introduction. Only then can 
we see how Kant prepares the ground for the unification of metaphysics and physics, and what 
light this sheds on the terms more generally. Furthermore, it is only through reconstruction that 
we may find a unique pathway from the first Critique to Transition on the notion of unity. 
                                                 
54 OP 21:525; 36 (t.m) 
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 In fascicle IV Kant says, ‘Merely empirical science of nature can never amount to a 
system, but, at best, a fragmentary, always-increasing aggregate’;55 and he later continues, 
 
The metaphysical foundations have a tendency toward physics as a system of the moving forces 
of matter. Such a system cannot arise from mere experiences, for that would yield only 
aggregates which lack the completeness of a whole; nor can it come about solely a priori, for 
that would be metaphysical foundations, which, however, contained no moving forces.56 
 
The lexicon Kant uses in these two quotations is consistent throughout Opus postumum. He 
repeatedly uses terms such as ‘aggregate’ and ‘fragment’ to denote physics as an empirical 
activity. In the marginalia of fascicle II, Kant is particularly direct: ‘The empirical is a 
fragmentary aggregate, and belongs to physics. Only metaphysics creates the form of the 
whole.’57 Thus, the schema seems clear: empirical science can only produce aggregates, which 
lack the requirements needed to form a coherent totality or system. 
On the face of it, such a conception seems to rest on the critical notion of regulative 
ideas of reason as developed in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic of the first 
Critique. So, can we explain Kant’s concept of an aggregate in the Transition simply by reading 
the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic? 
 In the Appendix, Kant shows how ideas of reason work on cognitions given by the 
understanding to bring about their systematic ‘interconnection’ (Zusammenhang).58 Kant says, 
‘this idea postulates complete unity of the understanding’s cognition, through which this 
cognition comes to be not merely a contingent aggregate but a system interconnected in 
accordance with necessary laws.’59 Yet, if we are to avoid dialectical error, the ideas cannot be 
                                                 
55 OP 21:474; 39 (t.m) 
56 OP 21:478; 42 
57 OP 21:183; 59 
58 CPR A645/B673 
59 CPR A645/B673 
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considered ‘constitutive,’ – they do not and cannot constitute a totality itself – but rather serve 
as ‘regulative’ guidelines in the projective formation of totality. In other words, no matter how 
much reason demands totality, it exceeds the possibility of experience and so we can only 
consider the idea a guideline if we are to remain undogmatic.60  
Kant also gives an example in the Appendix, which is illuminating in the current 
context. He pictures a scenario wherein many different effects are attributed to a ‘manifold of 
powers,’ but he suggests that these can be brought under a unified heading, entitled 
‘fundamental power.’61 The more equations of one power with another under the heading of 
fundamental power, the more a unity is said to be achieved. But, as Kant explains, ‘this unity 
of reason is merely hypothetical. One asserts not that such a power must in fact be found, but 
rather that one must seek it for the benefit of reason, namely for setting up certain principles 
for the many rules with which experience may furnish us.’62 Fundamental power can only be 
a regulative, heuristic idea of reason, which indicates what the problem is and keeps open the 
pathway to constructing a totality, but is not a true unity itself. 
In a compelling essay entitled, ‘Brain Water, the Ether and the Art of Constructing 
Systems,’ Alexander Rueger claims that for Kant, the systematicity of natural science as it 
emerges in the Transition is also regulative in the way outlined above.63 It must be admitted 
that Kant does seem sceptical about physics attaining constitutive systematic unity on its own 
terms since it is aligned entirely with the empirical. As the quote from fascicle IV suggests, it 
can only achieve an ‘ever-increasing aggregate’ and in this connection it seems logical, to any 
well-versed Kantian, to claim that physics rests upon a regulative idea of totality, that is, it 
requires an inherently metaphysical foundation to achieve unity. 
                                                 
60 Maimon puts it well: ‘For Kant, ideas are principles of reason that by their nature demand the unconditioned 
for every conditioned.’ Maimon (2010, 226) 
61 CPR A649/B677 
62 CPR A649-50/B677-8 
63 Rueger (2009, 34) 
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Such a reading also has the benefit of being quite easy to give a contemporary 
correlative. For example, it seems obvious that if we take a material fact, e.g., about the rotation 
of a particle, and stay within the bounds of the discipline it emerged from, e.g., particle physics, 
we could not go beyond the regulative totality that the original discipline tries to achieve, e.g., 
the completion of the standard model. Accordingly, we could not construct a constitutive 
totality, e.g., a grand theory of everything, which would need a wider connection to other 
paradigms, for example, cosmology or astronomy. Instead, the fact about the rotation of a 
particle would cumulatively add to the discipline of particle physics alone, leaving us with what 
Thomas S. Kuhn calls ‘mere facts,’ that is, isolated elements of knowledge, which are 
‘unrelated and unrelatable’ to wider research projects.64  
Although useful, this analysis cannot be accepted as Kant’s view in the Transition, for 
he explicitly states – and confirms an argument against Rueger’s – in fascicle IX: ‘There is a 
not merely regulative, but also constitutive formal a priori principle of the science of nature, 
for the purpose of a system.’65 In other words, in the case of physics, systematic unity must be 
something more than, and prior to regulative ideas; it must have a constitutive base inherently 
bound up with its practice. Kant goes on to problematize this reading even more, where in the 
same fascicle he notes, ‘Regulative principles which are also constitutive.’66 We find a similar 
contention in the introductory remarks of Physical Geography, published in 1802: ‘for in a 
system the whole is prior to the parts, while in an aggregation the parts have priority.’67 The 
priority of the whole means it has a constitutive base, a totality which goes well beyond a 
regulative collection of parts. Accordingly, Kant prompts us to go further than the Appendix 
to the Transcendental Dialectic to grasp a more subtle, complex and problematic notion of 
systematic unity in the Transition. 
                                                 
64 Kuhn (2012, 35) 
65 OP 22:240; 56 (t.m) 
66 OP 22:241; 57 
67 PG 9:158 
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I would like to bring out another aspect of the preceding discussion. It is clear that there 
is a difference between the act of fact gathering and the act of sewing them into a meaningful 
totality. In the Transition, Kant anticipates that this difference cannot be avoided in natural 
science. One striking example is given in fascicle XI, where Kant says, ‘It is not by compilation, 
but according to a principle of connection of the moving forces of matter in a system…that can 
yield an a priori cognition of the object.’68 Stephen Howard points out that the word 
‘stoppelung’ is translated into ‘compilation’ in the English translation of Opus postumum.69 
This has the effect of rendering the act of ‘gleaning’ quite insignificant, but it is a vastly 
important definition in the Transition. Accordingly, Howard modifies the translation to 
‘scrabbling-together,’ which I think conveys Kant’s intention more effectively, despite its 
apparent clumsiness. When we fit this modification into the general thesis of the Transition 
where it is concerned with aggregates, it would read: instead of scrabbling-together isolated 
empirical facts, we must find the principle of their connection to form a system out of them. 
The importance of a principle of connection is a consistent thread throughout Kant’s 
work. Even in notes to his Lectures on Metaphysics from the mid 1770’s, for example, the 
claim is made that, ‘in every whole there are connections (Verknüpfung) and there are 
connections (Zusammenhang).’70 In English this sentence clearly loses its potency, but in 
German we see the difference between ‘eine Verknüpfung’ and ‘ein Zusammenhang.’ As we 
saw above in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Zusammenhang was translated as 
‘interconnection,’ and that seems applicable here also; the author of the notes goes on to 
question, ‘But how is an interaction in a whole even possible?…for where there is an aggregate 
of substances there is not yet a world, rather the interaction of substances first constitutes a 
                                                 
68 OP 22:509; 150 (italics added) 
69 Howard (2017, 214) 
70 LM 28:212 
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world.’71 Likewise, a principle of Zusammenhang or interconnection is exactly what Kant 
seeks in the Transition, otherwise physics will remain fragmentary, aggregated and regulative. 
But herein lies Kant’s enormous, seemingly impossible task: what would such a principle 
consist of?  
We have so far seen how Kant encounters a problem when constructing a system based 
on physics alone. To answer the question just stated, it is tempting to resort to a metaphysical, 
a priori principle to provide such an interconnection. This certainly seems the case in the first 
Critique and Metaphysical Foundations as well as in some key passages in Opus postumum 
and would garner an initial base for tying the Transition into the critical edifice more 
comprehensively. One example is in fascicle X, where Kant says,  
 
To empirically take hold of the moving forces of matter and to collect them fragmentarily cannot 
ground physics as a science. Rather, it must be capable of being erected as a whole – not as an 
aggregate (sparism) but as a system (coniunctim) – according to an a priori principle which 
determines the number and order of the moving forces.72  
 
This suggests that an a priori principle is responsible for the arrangement of physics and is the 
key to its systematicity or interconnection. Echoing the operation of the categories in the first 
Critique, such a principle would determine the different empirical species of forces and their 
order, but would itself be based on total a priori derivation. The problem with this reading is 
that the Transition would then only sketch out a passage from one a priori cognition (the 
moving forces of matter) to another a priori cognition (the systematic unity of these forces), 
                                                 
71 LM 28:212. (italics added) An unlikely echo of this definition is found in Markus Gabriel’s realist manifesto, 
Why the World does not Exist, when he states, ‘When I say that the answer must be “systematic,” I mean only that 
we employ considerations in which the principles and thought trains that we establish and justify are connected 
with one another and make up a single body of thought, a theory.’ Gabriel (2015, 51) 
72 OP 22:322; 108 (t.m) 
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rather than the more radical thesis Kant actually strives for, namely, that it steps from a priori 
to empirical operations. 
Kant also bluntly proclaims that we cannot form a systematic unity based on a priori 
principles alone in the block quotation from fascicle IV that opened this section: ‘nor can it 
come about solely a priori.’ In illustration, and returning to the example above, if we only 
speculate about rotating particles a priori, we could not provide an adequate ‘frame of 
reference’ for empirical investigation and measurement to take place. It would be like using 
the Metaphysical Foundations as a map for locating and explaining geological markers, such 
as lashes in rock or scars on the ocean floor. We would fall upon an aggregate of universalizing 
principles, which would be at best unreliable, at worst in serious dialectical error and 
fundamentally regulative. Moreover, the two sides would be no closer to unification; the ‘gap’ 
would remain. Kant seems fully aware of this danger in the Transition and accordingly 
instigates a tortuous, critical trajectory to avoid constructing a notion of systematic unity and 
interconnection on the back of metaphysics alone.  
Instead, in the Transition at least, a system must comprise equal (albeit different) 
empirical and a priori parts: ‘For those concepts, which lead across from a system of one sort 
[metaphysical foundations] to another [physics], must be accompanied by empirical principles 
as well as a priori principles.’73 That is, the concepts that are formulated between metaphysics 
and physics, as a part of the transition from the one to the other, are ‘Mittelbegriffe,’ 
‘Zwischenbegriffe’ or ‘intermediary concepts’: ‘The transition from one science to the other 
must have certain intermediary concepts (Zwischenbegriffe), which are given in the one and 
are applied in the other, and which thus belong to both territories alike.’74 The methodological 
import of this figuration is that the Transition uses architectonic elements, not merely to present 
                                                 
73 OP 21:482; 43 (t.m) and see OP 22:375-6 
74 OP 21:525; 37 
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a system, but to devise a unique type of concept, whose content is shared, to allow for a flow 
between the two disciplines and systematic unity (Zusammenhang, interconnection) to be 
achieved. In this regard, the architectonic elements found in the Transition constitute a kind of 
building-site, rather than a complete description, wherein the transition takes place via concepts 
whose content can be considered both regulative and constitutive, a priori and empirical, 
metaphysical and physical.75 Such a building-site is constantly evolving in its experimental 
construction and synthesis of concepts; disciplines divide and coalesce, and concepts are 
smashed together to form intermediary concepts halfway between metaphysics and physics. It 
is a work-in-progress, which allows for interconnections (Zusammenhänge) to emerge, but 
ultimately, it is a messy methodological site upon which Kant tries out various configurations. 
But residual questions remain. One such question is: does the Transition enact 
systematic unity of metaphysics and physics through the intermediary concepts? I do not think 
they enact systematic unity on their own, but I do think they highlight a key path for creating 
such a unity. The more intermediary concepts are developed, the more they draw the disciplines 
closer together into a unified site. The intermediary concepts imply, however, a changed 
concept of unity: instead of a static unification, Kant wants to institute a fluid, evolving – yet 
still systematic – interconnection (Zusammenhang). Hence, we can say that this is Kant’s 
attempt to theorize a space that allows for interconnected a priori and empirical dimensions for 
the purposes of unifying metaphysics and physics. This prompts a further question: in so far as 
the intermediary concepts play a crucial role in setting up this interconnection, does this 
constitute Kant’s final attempt at systematic unity? As methodological markers, intermediary 
concepts certainly act as one of Kant’s last formulations to bring about systematic unity, but 
we must remember that the fascicles where they arise are written around 1798, and Kant writes 
                                                 
75 Hoppe (1969, 84-5) has also suggested this: ‘The intermediary concepts (Mittelbegriffe) thus uniquely connect 
the empirical and a priori; they realize the a priori concept of the object, but simultaneously they objectify the 
empirically given.’ (m.t)  
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much more after that point. Hansgeorg Hoppe even suggests the ‘hint’ that the transition itself 
– and hence the attempt at systematic unity of metaphysics and physics proper – may actually 
be found in fascicles X and XI,76 written around 1799-1800, wherein Kant starts from the 
conditions of possibility of scientific experiment. The question as to Kant’s last attempt of 
systematic unity remains open and prompts further Opus postumum study to explore the 
varying answers available to us, depending on which fascicles we take into account. 
 
4. Architectonic of Transition, Transition of Architectonic 
In this last section I would like to open the preceding to a more general perspective concerning 
the relation between Transition and the critical edifice. My contention is that by leading up to 
the Transition as a type of methodological building-site upon which metaphysics and physics 
are systematically divided and then united through intermediary concepts (Mittelbegriffe, 
Zwischenbegriffe), we must change how we understand the Architectonic of Pure Reason. That 
is, if we work retroactively, reading the methodological dimension of Transition as a frame for 
understanding the Architectonic of Pure Reason, we find a radical modification of the latter. 
 Recall that the basic stance of the Architectonic of Pure Reason is that of unification 
and ‘the art of systems,’77 which occurs by transforming aggregates into a unity. And such 
systems are ‘formed, like maggots, by a generatio aequivoca, [spontaneous generation] from 
the mere confluence of aggregated concepts’.78 In short, there is a contingency to the formation 
of systems from aggregates; parts just so happen to be worked into more complete and unified 
constructs or disciplines through spontaneous generation and collection.79 Furthermore, there 
                                                 
76 Hoppe (1969, 117) 
77 CPR A832/B860 
78 CPR A835/B863 
79 I described it on p.24 as ‘fact gathering’ with reference to Howard’s ‘scrabbling-together.’ 
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is a ‘natural unity of the parts that have been brought together,’80 and each distinct discipline 
of pure reason is marked by such a natural unity. 
 We do not have to make too many assumptions – in light of the exegetical sections of 
this essay – to claim that a very different model of architectonic is at stake in Transition. In the 
latter work, where its architectonic side is discerned, there is no natural, spontaneous unity or 
natural formation of aggregates into wholes (Ganze). Rather, there is rigorous division along 
clear and hence artificially drawn lines. There is then a considerable labour over developing a 
method for unifying this division. As I indicated in the previous section, the usage of 
architectonic then becomes a type of building-site upon which metaphysics and physics 
interconnect, albeit with significant residual problems. When we go back to the Architectonic 
of Pure Reason with this trajectory in hand, a rigidity can be discerned, whereby disciplines 
are delineated without any chance of transitioning, let alone sharing concepts (Mittelbegriffe, 
Zwischenbegriffe). In short, we see clearer than ever a Kant who is a true disciple of Linnaeus 
in the Architectonic of Pure Reason and a Kant who has an Anaxagorean quality in Transition. 
 In this connection, no longer can we read the Architectonic as a thorough critical thesis 
concerning the divisions and natural unifications of metaphysics and physics, nor can we 
consider it Kant’s final say on the matter. Rather, we are prompted to subtract certain of its 
elements and place them into the more experimental terms of Transition. For example, the 
whole system of metaphysics (‘1. Ontology. 2. Rational Physiology. 3. Rational Cosmology. 
4. Rational Theology’)81 makes no sense according to the architectonic of Transition, since we 
have a confused term, ‘Rational Physiology,’ which Kant notes has physica rationalis within 
it as a subordinated type of metaphysics. This problem does not arise in Transition since Kant 
is working with a binary opposition between metaphysics and physics, trying to construct the 
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point at which they interconnect rather than assuming it. And here is where we find the greatest 
transformation of the Architectonic of Pure Reason: we are forced to read it as containing a 
huge leap between disciplines without explanation as to how such a leap is made across 
supposed rigid lines. 
 With this in mind, we could say that along with architectonic in the Transition, we also 
find a tacit transition of the Architectonic in the Transition. No longer can we consider it the 
art of systems, but the art of shared concepts (Mittelbegriffe, Zwischenbegriffe), the art of 
interconnection and the art of breaking down previously assumed unities. The architectonic 
elements in Transition open problematizations of the critical edifice, but they also hint at how 
we could creatively redefine these areas of problematization. I can envisage reading the whole 
Doctrine of Method a-new in this way – although I cannot provide such a reading in the space 
I have here – and it is the Transition which gives us the creative impulse to do so. 
 Further, the implications this has on understanding other parts of the critical edifice 
may be great. Such divisions as sensibility and understanding, intuition and concept, and most 
importantly, a priori and empirical cognition may have to be radically re-examined and redrawn 
in light of the architectonic of Transition.82 Herein we have gained a deeper picture of a thinker 
who is prepared to question and re-question his own supposedly firm critical distinctions from 
the ground up. The Transition shows us that Kant did not arrive at his concepts ready-made, 
but laboured over their meaning, distinctiveness, unity and development relentlessly, 
subjecting them to endless scrutiny and reformulation. And this is the stance that we are also 
asked to adopt in reading Transition: to modify, adapt and transform basic tenets of the critical 
edifice from the ground up. There is, perhaps, more work to be done than we first anticipated.  
 
                                                 
82 This, for example, is Tuschling’s conclusion when he claims, ‘Thus the entire systematic of the first Critique 
and, in particular, the relations between Aesthetic, Analytic, and Dialectic are put into question…A priori and 
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